

Comprehensive Implementation Guide: Secure OCI Network Architecture with Network Firewall and WAF

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1. Project Overview

This project, **PRJ-OCI-NET-096**, establishes a **robust, multi-layered, and compliant network security architecture** within Oracle Cloud Infrastructure (OCI). It is designed to implement a defense-in-depth strategy by integrating OCI's native security services to inspect and protect both inbound (North-South) and internal (East-West) network traffic.

The core components of this architecture are:

- OCI Network Firewall (NF):** A next-generation firewall service providing deep packet inspection (DPI), intrusion prevention system (IPS), and URL filtering capabilities. It acts as the central inspection point for all inter-subnet traffic.
- OCI Web Application Firewall (WAF):** Protects internet-facing applications hosted behind the Load Balancer from common web exploits, such as SQL injection, cross-site scripting (XSS), and other OWASP Top 10 vulnerabilities.
- OCI Load Balancer (LB):** Provides high availability, fault tolerance, and a single entry point for external traffic, which is then protected by the WAF.
- OCI DDoS Protection Service:** Automatically mitigates large-scale volumetric attacks at the OCI network edge, ensuring service continuity and resilience.
- VCN Flow Logs:** Provides comprehensive, real-time network traffic visibility essential for security monitoring, threat hunting, and compliance auditing.

This architecture ensures that all application traffic is subjected to rigorous security scrutiny before reaching the application layer, significantly reducing the attack surface

and providing the necessary audit trails for regulatory compliance.

2. Business Context: Quantified Value and ROI

The implementation of a centralized, managed security architecture like PRJ-OCI-NET-096 delivers substantial and quantifiable business value, moving beyond simple cost avoidance to driving operational efficiency and mitigating significant financial risk.

The Problem and Solution in Context

Traditional cloud network security often relies on decentralized security lists or third-party appliances, leading to complexity, inconsistent policy enforcement, and high operational overhead. The lack of deep packet inspection for East-West traffic is a critical vulnerability, allowing attackers to move laterally once the perimeter is breached.

This solution addresses these issues by centralizing inspection with the OCI Network Firewall, providing a single point of control for all network security policies.

Quantified Business Value and ROI

While the overall Return on Investment (ROI) for migrating to or operating on OCI is high—with studies indicating an average **five-year ROI of 393%** and average annual benefits of **\$11.6 million** for OCI customers [1]—the specific value of this security project can be quantified in three key areas:

Value Metric	Description	Quantified Impact
Risk Mitigation (Cost Avoidance)	Reduction in the likelihood and financial impact of a security breach.	Up to 80% reduction in successful web application attacks (via WAF) and \$4.24 million average cost of a data breach avoided [2].
Operational Efficiency	Centralized policy management and reduced time spent on manual security configuration and troubleshooting.	30-50% reduction in network security management time, freeing up FTEs for strategic work.
Compliance Assurance	Automated logging and enforcement of controls required by major regulatory frameworks.	Accelerated audit cycles and reduced fines/penalties associated with non-compliance (e.g., up to 4% of global annual revenue for GDPR).
Service Continuity	Protection against large-scale denial-of-service attacks.	Near-zero downtime from volumetric DDoS attacks, protecting revenue streams and brand reputation.

By implementing the OCI Network Firewall, organizations shift from a reactive security posture to a proactive one, ensuring that security is enforced consistently across the entire Virtual Cloud Network (VCN). The deep packet inspection capability is crucial for detecting and preventing modern, sophisticated threats that bypass traditional stateful firewalls.

3. GRC Mapping: Compliance and Control Alignment

The PRJ-OCI-NET-096 architecture is fundamentally a compliance-enabling solution. The integrated security services directly map to critical controls across major global Governance, Risk, and Compliance (GRC) frameworks.

Control Implementation Matrix

Framework	Control ID / Requirement	Control Description	OCI Service Mapping
NIST SP 800-53	SC-7 (Boundary Protection)	Monitor and control communications at the external boundary and key internal boundaries of the system.	OCI Network Firewall (Deep Packet Inspection, IPS) and Security Lists/NSGs (Micro-segmentation).
ISO/IEC 27001:2022	A.5.19 (Network Security)	Networks should be secured, managed, and controlled to protect information in systems and applications.	OCI Network Firewall (Centralized policy), VCN Flow Logs (Monitoring), WAF (Application layer protection).
SOC 2	CC6.6 (Logical Access)	Controls are in place to prevent unauthorized access to the network and systems.	Security Lists/NSGs (Network access control) and OCI Network Firewall (Intrusion Prevention).
PCI DSS v4.0	Requirement 1 (Firewall)	Implement and manage network security controls.	OCI Network Firewall (Next-Gen Firewall) and WAF (Application Firewall).
HIPAA	§ 164.312(e) (Transmission Security)	Implement technical security measures to guard against unauthorized access to electronic protected health information (ePHI) that is being transmitted over an electronic communications network.	OCI Network Firewall (Egress filtering to prevent data exfiltration) and WAF (Protection of web-based ePHI access points).

Audit Evidence and Assurance

The solution provides robust, non-repudiable audit evidence for compliance reporting:

- **VCN Flow Logs:** Detailed records of all network traffic, including source/destination IP, port, protocol, and action (accept/reject).
- **Network Firewall Logs:** Specific logs detailing DPI findings, IPS alerts, URL filtering blocks, and rule hit counts.
- **WAF Logs:** Records of all blocked and challenged web requests, including the specific attack signature detected.

This centralized logging capability significantly streamlines the audit process, allowing compliance teams to quickly demonstrate adherence to network security controls.

4. Prerequisites: Accounts, Tools, and Setup

Before beginning the deployment, ensure the following prerequisites are met.

4.1. OCI Account and Permissions

1. **OCI Tenancy:** Access to an Oracle Cloud Infrastructure tenancy.
2. **IAM Policy:** The deploying user must belong to an IAM group with policies that grant `manage` permissions for the following resource types in the target compartment:
 - `vcns` (for VCN, Subnets, Gateways, Route Tables)
 - `network-firewalls` and `network-firewall-policies`
 - `load-balancers`
 - `waas-policies` and `web-app-firewalls`

4.2. Tools and Environment Setup

1. **OCI Command Line Interface (CLI):** The OCI CLI is required for executing the deployment commands.
 - **Installation:** Follow the official Oracle documentation for installing the OCI CLI on your operating system.
 - **Configuration:** Run `oci setup config` and ensure the configuration file (`~/.oci/config`) and API key are correctly set up for the target region and tenancy.

2. **Bash Shell:** The provided commands are written for a standard Bash environment.
3. **JSON Processor:** The `jq` utility is highly recommended for processing JSON output from OCI CLI commands, though the provided scripts use basic shell parsing (`--query 'data.id' --raw-output`).

4.3. Environment Variables

The following environment variables must be defined to ensure the deployment script is idempotent and easily configurable.

```
# OCI Configuration
export COMPARTMENT_ID="ocid1.compartment.oc1..xxxxxx" # Replace with your
target compartment OCID
export REGION="us-ashburn-1" # Replace with your target region

# VCN and Subnet Configuration
export VCN_CIDR="10.0.0.0/16"
export VCN_NAME="SecureVCN-PRJ-096"
export PUBLIC_SUBNET_CIDR="10.0.1.0/24" # For Load Balancer/WAF
export FIREWALL_SUBNET_CIDR="10.0.2.0/24" # For OCI Network Firewall
export PRIVATE_SUBNET_CIDR="10.0.3.0/24" # For Application Servers

# Service Names
export WAF_POLICY_NAME="WebPolicy-PRJ-096"
export NF_POLICY_NAME="NFPolicy-PRJ-096"
export NF_NAME="NetworkFirewall-PRJ-096"
export LB_NAME="SecureLoadBalancer-PRJ-096"
export APP_DOMAIN="www.example.com" # Domain for WAF policy
```

5. Architecture Overview: Hub-and-Spoke with Hairpin Routing

The architecture is a classic **Hub-and-Spoke** model optimized for security inspection. The VCN acts as the hub, and the subnets are the spokes, with the OCI Network Firewall strategically placed to enforce a **security choke point**.

5.1. Component Placement

Component	Subnet	Role	Traffic Flow
OCI Load Balancer (LB)	Public Subnet (10.0.1.0/24)	Entry point for North-South (Inbound) traffic. Protected by WAF.	Inbound traffic from Internet Gateway (IG).
OCI Network Firewall (NF)	Firewall Subnet (10.0.2.0/24)	Central inspection point for all inter-subnet and egress traffic.	All traffic between Public and Private, and all egress traffic.
Application Servers	Private Subnet (10.0.3.0/24)	Hosts the protected application. No direct internet access.	Receives traffic only from the NF.
Gateways	VCN Level	IG for inbound internet, NAT Gateway (NG) for private egress.	IG handles public ingress; NG handles private egress.

5.2. Critical Routing Configuration (Hairpinning)

The key to enforcing security is the custom routing tables that force all relevant traffic through the Network Firewall's private IP address. This is often referred to as **hairpin routing** or **forced inspection**.

1. Inbound (North-South) Flow:

- Internet traffic hits the **Internet Gateway (IG)**.
- The **Public Subnet's Route Table** must contain a rule that directs traffic destined for the **Private Subnet CIDR (10.0.3.0/24)** to the **Network Firewall's VNIC** as the next hop.
- The NF inspects the traffic and forwards it to the Private Subnet.

2. Egress (North-South) Flow:

- Traffic originating from the Private Subnet destined for the internet (0.0.0.0/0).
- The **Private Subnet's Route Table** must direct all internet-bound traffic to the **Network Firewall's VNIC** as the next hop.

- The NF inspects the traffic and forwards it to the **NAT Gateway (NG)**, which then sends it to the internet.

3. East-West Flow (Inter-Subnet):

- Traffic between the Public Subnet and the Private Subnet (e.g., LB to App Server).
- The routing rules described in the Inbound flow (Public RT -> NF) and the Private RT (NF -> Private Subnet) ensure that all traffic passing between these two subnets is forced through the Network Firewall for inspection.

This setup guarantees that the Network Firewall is the mandatory **security choke point** for all critical traffic flows.

6. Step-by-Step Implementation

The deployment is executed using the OCI Command Line Interface (CLI). It is highly recommended to save all commands into a single shell script (`deploy_oci_net_096.sh`) and execute it sequentially.

Step 6.1: Create VCN, Gateways, and Subnets

This step establishes the foundational network infrastructure.

```

#!/bin/bash
# Load environment variables (assuming they are set as per Section 4.3)

echo "--- 6.1: Creating VCN, Gateways, and Subnets ---"

# 1. Create the Virtual Cloud Network (VCN)
VCN_ID=$(oci network vcn create --compartment-id $COMPARTMENT_ID --cidr-
block $VCN_CIDR --display-name $VCN_NAME --query 'data.id' --raw-output)
echo "VCN ID: $VCN_ID"

# 2. Create Internet Gateway (IG) and NAT Gateway (NG)
IG_ID=$(oci network internet-gateway create --compartment-id $COMPARTMENT_ID
--vcn-id $VCN_ID --display-name "IG-$VCN_NAME" --is-enabled true --query
'data.id' --raw-output)
NG_ID=$(oci network nat-gateway create --compartment-id $COMPARTMENT_ID --
vcn-id $VCN_ID --display-name "NG-$VCN_NAME" --query 'data.id' --raw-output)
echo "IG ID: $IG_ID"
echo "NG ID: $NG_ID"

# 3. Create Route Tables (RT)
# Default RT for Public Subnet (Internet access) - Will be updated later for
NF
PUBLIC_RT_ID=$(oci network route-table create --compartment-id
$COMPARTMENT_ID --vcn-id $VCN_ID --display-name "RT-Public" --route-rules "
[{\\"cidrBlock\\":\\"0.0.0.0/0\\", \\"networkEntityId\\":\\"$IG_ID\\"}]" --query
'data.id' --raw-output)
echo "Public RT ID: $PUBLIC_RT_ID"

# Private RT for Private Subnet (NAT access) - Will be updated later for NF
PRIVATE_RT_ID=$(oci network route-table create --compartment-id
$COMPARTMENT_ID --vcn-id $VCN_ID --display-name "RT-Private" --route-rules "
[{\\"cidrBlock\\":\\"0.0.0.0/0\\", \\"networkEntityId\\":\\"$NG_ID\\"}]" --query
'data.id' --raw-output)
echo "Private RT ID: $PRIVATE_RT_ID"

# 4. Create Subnets
PUBLIC_SUBNET_ID=$(oci network subnet create --compartment-id
$COMPARTMENT_ID --vcn-id $VCN_ID --cidr-block $PUBLIC_SUBNET_CIDR --display-
name "PublicSubnet" --route-table-id $PUBLIC_RT_ID --prohibit-public-ip-on-
vnic false --query 'data.id' --raw-output)
FIREWALL_SUBNET_ID=$(oci network subnet create --compartment-id
$COMPARTMENT_ID --vcn-id $VCN_ID --cidr-block $FIREWALL_SUBNET_CIDR --
display-name "FirewallSubnet" --route-table-id $PRIVATE_RT_ID --prohibit-
public-ip-on-vnic true --query 'data.id' --raw-output)
PRIVATE_SUBNET_ID=$(oci network subnet create --compartment-id

```

```
$COMPARTMENT_ID --vcn-id $VCN_ID --cidr-block $PRIVATE_SUBNET_CIDR --
display-name "PrivateSubnet" --route-table-id $PRIVATE_RT_ID --prohibit-
public-ip-on-vnic true --query 'data.id' --raw-output)
echo "Public Subnet ID: $PUBLIC_SUBNET_ID"
echo "Firewall Subnet ID: $FIREWALL_SUBNET_ID"
echo "Private Subnet ID: $PRIVATE_SUBNET_ID"
```

Step 6.2: Configure OCI Network Firewall

This step creates the Network Firewall Policy, deploys the NF instance, and, most critically, updates the routing tables to enforce traffic inspection.

6.2.1. Create NF Policy and Instance

First, create the policy and the firewall instance in the dedicated subnet.

```

echo "--- 6.2.1: Creating NF Policy and Instance ---"

# 1. Create Network Firewall Policy (Minimal)
NF_POLICY_ID=$(oci network-firewall network-firewall-policy create --
compartment-id $COMPARTMENT_ID --display-name $NF_POLICY_NAME --query
'data.id' --raw-output)
echo "NF Policy ID: $NF_POLICY_ID"

# Wait for the policy to be created (omitted for brevity, but recommended in
script)

# 2. Create Network Firewall Instance
NF_ID=$(oci network-firewall network-firewall create --compartment-id
$COMPARTMENT_ID --network-firewall-policy-id $NF_POLICY_ID --vcn-id $VCN_ID
--subnet-id $FIREWALL_SUBNET_ID --display-name $NF_NAME --query 'data.id' --
raw-output)
echo "Network Firewall ID: $NF_ID"

# Wait for the Network Firewall to become ACTIVE (This can take several
minutes)
echo "Waiting for Network Firewall to become ACTIVE..."
oci network-firewall network-firewall get --network-firewall-id $NF_ID --
query 'data."lifecycle-state"' --raw-output | grep -q "ACTIVE" || sleep 120
# Placeholder for a proper wait loop

# 3. Get the Network Firewall's VNIC ID (This is the next hop for routing)
NF_VNIC_ID=$(oci network-firewall network-firewall get --network-firewall-id
$NF_ID --query 'data."network-firewall-device-id"' --raw-output)
echo "Network Firewall VNIC ID (Next Hop): $NF_VNIC_ID"

```

6.2.2. Update Route Tables for Forced Inspection

This is the most critical part of the deployment, implementing the hairpin routing.

```

echo "--- 6.2.2: Updating Route Tables for Forced Inspection ---"

# 1. Update Public RT (RT-Public):
# Goal: Route traffic destined for the Private Subnet (East-West/Inbound)
through the Network Firewall.
# The existing 0.0.0.0/0 rule to the IG remains for general internet
traffic.
oci network route-table update --rt-id $PUBLIC_RT_ID --route-rules "
[{"cidrBlock\":\"$PRIVATE_SUBNET_CIDR\",
\"networkEntityId\":\"$NF_VNIC_ID\"}]" --force

# 2. Update Private RT (RT-Private):
# Goal: Route all egress traffic (0.0.0.0/0) through the Network Firewall.
# This replaces the initial rule to the NAT Gateway (NG) with a rule to the
NF.
# The NF is configured to forward this traffic to the NG internally.
# NOTE: OCI CLI update command replaces the entire list of rules. We must
include the new rule and the existing rule to the NG.
# However, for forced inspection, the NF must be the next hop for 0.0.0.0/0.
# We must first remove the existing rule to the NG, and replace it with a
rule to the NF.
# The NF will then be configured to forward to the NG.

# Step 2a: Remove the old 0.0.0.0/0 rule to the NG from the Private RT (if
it exists)
# This is complex via CLI. A simpler approach is to use the update command
to replace the ruleset.
# We will define the new ruleset for the Private RT:
# Rule 1: 0.0.0.0/0 -> NF_VNIC_ID (All egress traffic goes to NF for
inspection)
oci network route-table update --rt-id $PRIVATE_RT_ID --route-rules "
[{"cidrBlock\":\"0.0.0.0/0\", \"networkEntityId\":\"$NF_VNIC_ID\"}]" --
force

echo "Routing updated: All traffic between Public/Private and all Private
Egress is now routed through the Network Firewall."

```

Step 6.3: Configure OCI Load Balancer and WAF

The Load Balancer is deployed in the Public Subnet, and the WAF is attached to it to protect the application entry point.

```

echo "--- 6.3: Configuring Load Balancer and WAF ---"

# 1. Create a Load Balancer (Public, minimum shape)
LB_ID=$(oci lb load-balancer create --compartment-id $COMPARTMENT_ID --
display-name $LB_NAME --shape-name "100Mbps" --subnet-ids "
[\ "$PUBLIC_SUBNET_ID\" ]" --is-private false --query 'data.id' --raw-output)
echo "Load Balancer ID: $LB_ID"

# Wait for LB to become ACTIVE (omitted for brevity)

# 2. Create a Backend Set (assuming a simple HTTP port 80)
oci lb backend-set create --load-balancer-id $LB_ID --name "AppBackendSet" -
-policy "ROUND_ROBIN" --health-checker '{"protocol": "HTTP", "port": 80,
"urlPath": "/health"}'

# 3. Create a Listener (HTTP on port 80)
oci lb listener create --load-balancer-id $LB_ID --default-backend-set-name
"AppBackendSet" --name "HttpListener" --port 80 --protocol "HTTP"

# 4. Create OCI WAF Policy (Regional WAF)
WAF_POLICY_ID=$(oci waas waas-policy create --compartment-id $COMPARTMENT_ID
--display-name $WAF_POLICY_NAME --domain $APP_DOMAIN --query 'data.id' --
raw-output)
echo "WAF Policy ID: $WAF_POLICY_ID"

# 5. Create a Web App Firewall (WAF) for the Load Balancer
WAF_ID=$(oci waas web-app-firewall create-for-load-balancer --compartment-id
$COMPARTMENT_ID --display-name "WAF-for-LB" --load-balancer-id $LB_ID --
waas-policy-id $WAF_POLICY_ID --query 'data.id' --raw-output)
echo "Web App Firewall ID: $WAF_ID"

```

Step 6.4: Configure Network Security Groups (NSGs)

NSGs provide the final layer of micro-segmentation, ensuring that only the Network Firewall can communicate with the application servers.

```

echo "---- 6.4: Configuring Network Security Groups (NSGs) ----"

# 1. Create NSGs
LB_NSg_ID=$(oci network nsg create --compartment-id $COMPARTMENT_ID --vcn-id
$VCN_ID --display-name "LB-NSG" --query 'data.id' --raw-output)
APP_NSg_ID=$(oci network nsg create --compartment-id $COMPARTMENT_ID --vcn-
id $VCN_ID --display-name "App-NSG" --query 'data.id' --raw-output)
echo "LB NSG ID: $LB_NSg_ID"
echo "App NSG ID: $APP_NSg_ID"

# 2. Add Ingress Rule to LB-NSG: Allow HTTP/HTTPS from Internet
# This NSG will be attached to the Load Balancer's VNIC.
oci network nsg rule add --nsg-id $LB_NSg_ID --ingress-security-rules
' [{"protocol": "6", "source": "0.0.0.0/0", "tcpOptions":
{"destinationPortRange": {"max": 443, "min": 80}}}]'

# 3. Add Ingress Rule to App-NSG: Allow traffic only from the Firewall
Subnet CIDR
# This NSG will be attached to the Application Server's VNIC.
# This ensures only traffic that has passed through the NF can reach the
application.
oci network nsg rule add --nsg-id $APP_NSg_ID --ingress-security-rules
' [{"protocol": "6", "source": "$FIREWALL_SUBNET_CIDR", "tcpOptions":
{"destinationPortRange": {"max": 80, "min": 80}}}]'

```

Step 6.5: Deploy Network Firewall Policy Rules

For production, the NF policy must be comprehensive. The following JSON defines a basic rule set, which should be expanded with IPS, URL filtering, and TLS inspection rules.

First, create the rule file:

```
// nf_policy_rules.json
{
  "securityRules": [
    {
      "action": "ALLOW",
      "name": "allow_http_from_lb_to_app",
      "protocol": "TCP",
      "sourceAddress": "10.0.1.0/24", // Public Subnet (where LB is)
      "destinationAddress": "10.0.3.0/24", // Private Subnet (where App is)
      "portRange": {
        "type": "PORT_RANGE",
        "min": 80,
        "max": 80
      }
    },
    {
      "action": "DROP",
      "name": "drop_all_other_ingress",
      "protocol": "ANY",
      "sourceAddress": "0.0.0.0/0",
      "destinationAddress": "0.0.0.0/0"
    }
  ],
  "urlLists": [],
  "decryptionRules": []
}
```

Then, apply the rules (or manage them individually):

```
# Example of adding a rule to the NF Policy (using the provided JSON
structure as a reference)
# In a real scenario, you would use the update command with a full ruleset.
# For simplicity, we show how to add a rule:
oci network-firewall network-firewall-policy rule create --network-firewall-
policy-id $NF_POLICY_ID --action ALLOW --name "Allow_HTTP_to_App" --protocol
TCP --source-address-list "Public_Subnet_CIDR" --destination-address-list
"Private_Subnet_CIDR" --port-range '{"type": "PORT_RANGE", "min": 80, "max":
80}'
```

7. Validation & Testing

A rigorous testing plan is essential to confirm that the security controls are functioning as intended.

7.1. Network Connectivity Test

Objective: Verify that the application is reachable via the WAF and Load Balancer, and that traffic is successfully routed through the Network Firewall.

Step	Command	Expected Outcome	Security Control Tested
1. Get LB IP	<pre>LB_IP=\$(oci lb load-balancer get --load-balancer-id \$LB_ID --query 'data."ip- addresses"[0].ip-address' -- raw-output)</pre>	A valid public IP address is returned.	Load Balancer deployment.
2. Curl Application	<pre>curl -I http://\$LB_IP</pre>	HTTP 200 OK or 302 Found response from the application server.	North-South Inbound Routing (IG -> LB -> NF -> App).
3. Ping Test (Internal)	<pre>oci compute instance launch ... (from a Public Subnet instance to a Private Subnet instance)</pre>	Ping fails (due to NSG/NF policy) unless explicitly allowed by the NF policy.	East-West Inspection.

7.2. WAF Protection Test

Objective: Verify that the OCI WAF is actively inspecting and blocking malicious web traffic.

Step	Command	Expected Outcome	Security Control Tested
1. SQL Injection Test	<pre>curl "http://\$LB_IP/?id=1%27%20OR%20%271%27=%271"</pre>	The request is blocked by the WAF, returning a WAF block page (e.g., HTTP 403 Forbidden) instead of the application response.	WAF Core Rule Set (CRS) enforcement.
2. XSS Test	<pre>curl "http://\$LB_IP/?q=<script>alert(1)</script>"</pre>	The request is blocked by the WAF.	WAF XSS protection.

7.3. Network Firewall Inspection Test

Objective: Verify that the Network Firewall is enforcing the policy rules for both ingress and egress traffic.

Step	Action	Expected Outcome	Security Control Tested
1. Egress Block Test	From an application server in the Private Subnet, attempt to access a known malicious or prohibited external URL (e.g., a test malware site).	The connection is immediately dropped, and the NF logs show a <code>DROP</code> action based on URL filtering or a configured egress rule.	North-South Egress Inspection.
2. Inter-Subnet Block Test	From a non-LB instance in the Public Subnet, attempt to connect to the Private Subnet application server on a non-allowed port (e.g., port 22).	The connection times out or is rejected, and the NF logs show a <code>DROP</code> action.	East-West Inspection and Principle of Least Privilege.

8. Troubleshooting

Troubleshooting a multi-layered security architecture requires a systematic approach, starting from the outermost layer (WAF/LB) and moving inward (NF/Router/NSG).

Issue	Potential Cause	Resolution
Load Balancer 502 Error	Backend set health check failing.	1. Verify the application is running on the correct port (e.g., 80) in the Private Subnet. 2. Check the App-NSG to ensure it allows ingress from the Firewall Subnet CIDR on the application port. 3. Check the Network Firewall logs for dropped packets between the NF and the application server.
WAF Block Page (False Positive)	Legitimate traffic is being blocked by an overly aggressive WAF rule.	1. Review the WAF access logs to identify the specific rule ID that triggered the block. 2. Whitelist the specific request path or IP address in the WAF policy, or disable the specific rule ID if necessary.
No Traffic to Private Subnet	Routing misconfiguration or Network Firewall policy blocking.	1. Check the Public Subnet's Route Table to ensure the rule for <code>\$PRIVATE_SUBNET_CIDR</code> points to the NF VNIC ID (<code>\$NF_VNIC_ID</code>). 2. Check the Network Firewall Policy to ensure an <code>ALLOW</code> rule exists for the traffic flow (e.g., <code>allow_http_from_lb_to_app</code>).
Private Subnet Cannot Reach Internet	Egress routing misconfiguration.	1. Check the Private Subnet's Route Table to ensure the <code>0.0.0.0/0</code> rule points to the NF VNIC ID (<code>\$NF_VNIC_ID</code>). 2. Verify the Network Firewall is configured to forward traffic to the NAT Gateway .
OCI CLI Command Fails	Incorrect environment variable or OCID.	1. Double-check that all environment variables (e.g., <code>\$COMPARTMENT_ID</code> , <code>\$VCN_CIDR</code>) are correctly set and exported. 2. Ensure the user's IAM policy grants the necessary <code>manage</code> permissions for the resource being created.

9. Cost Optimization

While security is paramount, optimizing the cost of the deployed services is crucial for a production-ready solution.

9.1. OCI Network Firewall Cost

The OCI Network Firewall cost is primarily based on two factors:

1. **Firewall Instance:** A fixed hourly cost for the firewall instance itself.
2. **Data Processed:** A variable cost based on the volume of data (GB) processed by the firewall.

Optimization Tips:

- **Sizing:** OCI Network Firewall is a managed service, but ensure the architecture is correctly sized. Avoid routing unnecessary traffic (e.g., internal backup traffic) through the NF if it doesn't require deep inspection.
- **Policy Efficiency:** Optimize the NF policy rules to minimize the processing load. Place the most frequently hit `DROP` or `ALLOW` rules at the top of the rule list for faster processing.

9.2. Load Balancer and WAF Cost

- **Load Balancer Shape:** Use the smallest shape (`100Mbps`) that meets the application's performance requirements. Only scale up the shape if performance metrics (e.g., CPU utilization, connection rate) indicate a bottleneck.
- **WAF Pricing:** OCI WAF (WAAS) is typically priced based on the number of HTTP/S requests processed.
 - **Rate Limiting:** Implement aggressive rate limiting policies in the WAF to block bot traffic and DDoS attempts early, reducing the total number of requests processed and thus lowering the WAF bill.
 - **Geoblocking:** Use WAF geoblocking features to deny traffic from regions where the application has no legitimate users, further reducing processed requests.

9.3. Logging and Storage

- **VCN Flow Logs:** Flow logs generate significant data volume. Configure the OCI Logging service to use a **short retention period** (e.g., 30 days) for raw flow logs, and only export critical security events (e.g., NF `DROP` actions, WAF blocks) to a long-term, cost-effective storage solution like OCI Object Storage or a dedicated Security Information and Event Management (SIEM) system.

10. Security Best Practices

The deployment of the Network Firewall and WAF provides a strong security foundation, but a production-ready environment requires adherence to broader security best practices.

10.1. Principle of Least Privilege (PoLP)

- **NSG/Security List Hardening:** Review and tighten all NSG and Security List rules. The current NSG rules are based on CIDR blocks (`$FIREWALL_SUBNET_CIDR`). For maximum security, if the Network Firewall's private IP is static or can be referenced, use that specific IP in the App-NSG ingress rule instead of the entire subnet CIDR.
- **IAM Policies:** Implement granular IAM policies for managing the network resources. For example, only Network Administrators should have `manage` permissions on `network-firewalls` , while Application Teams may only need `read` access.

10.2. Network Firewall Hardening

- **IPS and URL Filtering:** The minimal policy in the guide must be replaced with a comprehensive policy that includes:
 - **Intrusion Prevention System (IPS):** Enable and configure the NF's IPS engine to run in **Prevention Mode** to actively block known exploits and malware.
 - **URL Filtering:** Implement a URL filtering list to block access to known malicious, command-and-control (C2), or inappropriate websites from the Private Subnet.
 - **TLS Inspection:** For maximum security, implement TLS/SSL decryption rules to inspect encrypted traffic for hidden threats. This requires installing the NF's certificate on the application servers.

10.3. Monitoring, Logging, and Alerting

- **Centralized Logging:** Integrate VCN Flow Logs, Network Firewall logs, and WAF logs with **OCI Logging Analytics** or a third-party SIEM.

- **Security Alerts:** Configure OCI Monitoring alarms on critical metrics:
 - **Network Firewall:** High CPU utilization, high connection count, and a sudden spike in DROP actions.
 - **WAF:** High number of blocked requests (indicating an attack) or a sudden drop in legitimate traffic (indicating a false positive).
 - **DDoS:** Alerts on OCI DDoS Protection service mitigation events.

10.4. Application and Compute Hardening

- **Vulnerability Scanning:** Use the **OCI Vulnerability Scanning Service** on the application servers in the Private Subnet to regularly check for known vulnerabilities (CVEs) and misconfigurations.
 - **Patch Management:** Enforce a strict patch management policy for all operating systems and application dependencies in the Private Subnet.
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Appendix: Cleanup Commands

To remove all resources created during this deployment, execute the following commands in reverse order of creation. **Ensure all environment variables are still set before running.**

```
echo "--- 11. Cleanup: Deleting Resources ---"

# 1. Delete Web App Firewall
oci waas web-app-firewall delete --web-app-firewall-id $WAF_ID --force

# 2. Delete Load Balancer (this will also delete listeners and backend sets)
oci lb load-balancer delete --load-balancer-id $LB_ID --force

# 3. Delete Network Firewall
oci network-firewall network-firewall delete --network-firewall-id $NF_ID --force

# 4. Delete Network Firewall Policy
oci network-firewall network-firewall-policy delete --network-firewall-policy-id $NF_POLICY_ID --force

# 5. Delete Network Security Groups
oci network nsg delete --nsg-id $LB_NSX_ID --force
oci network nsg delete --nsg-id $APP_NSX_ID --force

# 6. Delete Subnets
oci network subnet delete --subnet-id $PUBLIC_SUBNET_ID --force
oci network subnet delete --subnet-id $FIREWALL_SUBNET_ID --force
oci network subnet delete --subnet-id $PRIVATE_SUBNET_ID --force

# 7. Delete Gateways
oci network internet-gateway delete --internet-gateway-id $IG_ID --force
oci network nat-gateway delete --nat-gateway-id $NG_ID --force

# 8. Delete Route Tables
oci network route-table delete --rt-id $PUBLIC_RT_ID --force
oci network route-table delete --rt-id $PRIVATE_RT_ID --force

# 9. Delete VCN
oci network vcn delete --vcn-id $VCN_ID --force

echo "Cleanup complete. All resources for PRJ-OCI-NET-096 have been deleted."
```

References

[1]: [The Business Value of Oracle Cloud Infrastructure \(OCI\)](#) [2]: [IBM Cost of a Data Breach Report 2023](#) [3]: [Oracle Cloud Compliance](#) [4]: [Overview of Security Best Practices in OCI Tenancy](#) [5]: [Network design considerations when using OCI Network Firewall](#) [6]: [OCI Network Firewall – Concepts and Deployment](#)